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Non-Technical Summary
The emergence of Business Groups is traditionally considered a phenomenon typical of countries at an early stage of development, where …rms with a formally autonomous legal status are put under a common and coordinated management in order to circumvent imperfections on inputs or credit markets. Moreover, a well documented literature provides evidence of their importance in the early history of industrialized nations. Nonetheless, in an economic environment in which Global Value
Chains are becoming increasingly important in shaping trade and production ‡ows internationally, we …nd that these organizational forms are very common across di¤erent economic and institutional environments, in both developing and developed economies, accounting for a lion's share of world value added. In fact, under our general de…nition, also multinational enterprises can be considered as Business Groups, since one of their distinctive features is to organize legally autonomous a¢ liates spanning across di¤erent countries under the common management of unique headquarters.
In order to characterize the phenomenon of (domestic and multinational) Business Groups, in this paper we map at the …rm-level 270,374 headquarters controlling 1,519,588 a¢ liates in 2010, across more than 200 countries and all industries, for a total of (unconsolidated) value added of some 28 US$ trillion. Two thirds of our BGs are originated in OECD economies, whose headquarters own about 76% of a¢ liates worldwide. The ratio of foreign to domestic a¢ liates is smaller for groups originating from developing countries (around .3), since these countries have a relatively larger proportion of …rms organized as domestic business groups, while the ratio is highest for the US (.85), where Business Group structures tend to operate abroad rather than domestically.
We embed Business Groups in the property rights theory of the …rm, considering them as hybrid organizations of economic activities, halfway between markets and hierarchies. Under this lens, we …nd that a distinctive characteristic of a Business Group is that it provides at the same time incentives to self-enforce promises of cooperation among units of production, given the control exerted by a common parent, without giving up the advantage (if and when necessary) of organizing activities within a market-like environment, since each a¢ liate maintains formal property rights on its production assets.
Combining insights from di¤erent strands of literature, we provide novel metrics able to assess the vertical integration of these structures at both the a¢ liate and the group-level. We then complement those metrics with a speci…c entropy-like measure of organizational complexity of hierarchical chains adapted from graph theory, which proxies the di¤erent costs of acquiring and communicating knowledge throughout the hierarchy.
Consistently with the property rights theory of the …rm, we …nd that better institutions lead to less vertical integration, both at the group and at the a¢ liate level. Moreover, Business Groups that have a high internal degree of vertical integration (between headquarters and a¢ liates) also tend to have relatively unspecialized (more integrated) a¢ liates. Interestingly, the a¢ liate and its group are at the margin less similar in terms of vertical integration in 'good' institutional environments, as a higher contract enforcement and/or a better …nancial development allow the single a¢ liate to specialize more, exchanging fewer inputs with coa¢ liates and the parent. Moreover, conditional on the quality of institutions, a negative correlation arises between vertical integration and organizational complexity: for a given level of …nancial development, more specialized (less integrated) a¢ liates end 2 up within more complex organizational structures.
We also …nd that the positive relationship between vertical integration and a¢ liates'productivity emerging in our data is not robust to the inclusion of a group's organizational complexity, thus providing yet another piece of evidence on the importance of considering jointly vertical integration and organizational complexity decisions in assessing Business Groups. The result is consistent with recent insights of organizational economics who models …rms as knowledge-based hierarchies where knowledge is a typical intangible and costly input complementary to physical inputs in production processes: since best intangible assets (such as best managers, best managerial practices) can be shared in presence of a larger number of units of production (in our case more complex hierarchies), their cost can be smoothed on a larger scale leading to a higher individual a¢ liates'productivity.
The relevance of intangible assets is also con…rmed by the fact that the relationship between organizational complexity and productivity is non-linear: above a certain threshold of complexity (around 550 a¢ liates and/or 5 levels of control) the relationship becomes negative. This result is in line with the idea that a minimum e¢ cient scale exists in the acquisition and communication of knowledge throughout the hierarchy, associated however to the emergence of endogenous communication costs of additional management layers, which should increase with complexity. Such an evidence of marginally decreasing returns from increasing complexity is relevant, as it puts a natural limit to the growth in complexity of business groups: indeed, only 1% of groups in our sample exceed this average 'optimal' organizational threshold 1 Introduction "The economics literature has not had much to say about non-standard organizational forms [...] now much discussed in the business and organizational literatures, including joint ventures, strategic alliances, networks, business groups, clans, and virtual organizations". [Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002] The emergence of Business Groups (BGs) is traditionally considered a phenomenon typical of countries at an early stage of development: in order to circumvent market imperfections, …rms with a formally autonomous legal status are put under a common control exerted by a parent entity, in a network-like hierarchical organization of economic activities 1 . And yet, the bene…ts of such an organizational form seem to be extensively seized by modern economies. After a cursory glance at the data, most of the Fortune 500 companies, the top 2,000 R&D …rms listed by the Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard (IRI, 2011) , as well as the top 100 largest multinational enterprises listed by UNCTAD (2011) can be included under the category of domestic or cross-border Business Group: these companies are in fact organized under headquarters controlling hierarchies of a¢ liates incorporated in their domestic market and/or abroad. 2 For example, the top 100 corporations listed by UNCTAD have an average of 625 a¢ liates each, located with roughly equal proportions both domestically and abroad (on average in 64 countries), with up to 10 di¤erent hierarchical levels of control.
In terms of trade ‡ows, a reading of the US BEA (2012) data along the dimension of Business
Groups reveals that at least 75% of total US trade can be linked to …rms organized as multinational BGs. 3 A similar exercise for France, where transaction-and …rm-level data have been matched to the ownership structure of companies, reveals that some 65% of total French imports or exports can be attributed to …rms (domestic or foreign-owned) that are part of a Business Group structure (Altomonte et al., 2012) .
However, while a large part of economic activity and trade can be attributed to …rms organized as Business Groups, these organizational forms have been relatively neglected in the economic literature, where usually the focus has been on either individual …rms' choices of vertical integration or, more recently, on the within-…rm organizational design for the transmission of management decisions. In this contribution we try to …ll this gap, by characterizing the presence of BGs across developing and developed countries and across industries, and by showing how, within BGs, vertical integration choices are not independent from the hierarchical organization of production units along the command chain.
To that extent, we capitalize on a unique dataset that we have built, able to map 270,374 head-quarters controlling 1,519,588 a¢ liates worldwide in 2010, across all industries. 4 Two thirds of our BGs are originated in OECD economies, whose headquarters control about 76% of a¢ liates worldwide.
The ratio of foreign to domestic a¢ liates is smaller for groups originating from developing countries (around .26, i.e. one foreign a¢ liate each four domestic ones on average), since these countries have a relatively larger proportion of …rms organized as domestic business groups (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) . 5 The ratio is instead highest for the US (.85), where in particular 32% of Business Groups are only domestic, 24% are only cross-border with all a¢ liates abroad, while 44% tend to operate both domestically and abroad.
As we have individual balance sheet data for (most of) these …rms, we are able to recover a total (unconsolidated) value added accruable to Business Groups of some 27.9 US$ trillion. We …nd that very simple Business Group structures (with one headquarter and one a¢ liate, located either domestically or abroad) represent 57% of our groups, but account for only 1% of the total value added in our data. On the contrary, around 2,000 of the largest BGs (headquarters with more than 100 a¢ liates, both domestic and cross-border) constitute less than 1% of groups in our sample but account for 72% of the total value-added measured in the data. In the US, these large 'mixed groups' operating both domestically and abroad report a value added equal to 83% of the total US value-added recorded in the sample.
From this cursory glance at the data, it then follows that a large part of economic activity is undertaken under organizational forms in which it might exist a correlation between the decision on vertical integration (make or buy) and the hierarchical organization of production (the design of the command chain, which becomes relevant when at least two a¢ liates are controlled by the same headquarter). In this paper we show that ignoring the latter correlation can lead to a number of omitted variable biases in the analysis of the organization of the …rm.
To explore more formally these issues, it is appropriate to nest Business Groups within the property rights theory of the …rm by considering Business Groups as entities that organize a number of formally independent …rms under a common hierarchy, in order to provide at the same time incentives to selfenforce promises of cooperation among units of production (given the control exerted by a common parent), without giving up the advantage, if and when necessary, of organizing activities within a market-like environment (since each a¢ liate maintains formal property rights on its production assets).
The theory of the …rm has been relatively silent on these organizational forms, with most authors implicitly assuming that …rms could be epitomized through a two-dimensional decision problem (Helpman, 2008) : whether to source intermediate inputs from within the …rm or not, i.e. the vertical integration decision; and whether to locate an economic activity in the country of origin or abroad, i.e. the o¤shoring decision. 6 A common …nding of this literature is that …rm boundaries depend on 4 Our primary source of data is ORBIS, a global dataset containing detailed balance sheet information for some 100 million companies worldwide. In addition, the database contains information on over 30 million shareholder/subsidiary links, that we have been able to organize across each …rm. The database has been signi…cantly expanded since 2009, with a better coverage of countries traditionally not well mapped such as Japan and the United States. More detailed information on the dataset, as well as its validation across countries, is discussed in Section 2. 5 This …nding is generally consistent with the idea that the boundaries of the …rm should be larger in the presence of a poor institutional environment and thus higher transaction costs. 6 The vertical integration decision has been explored by a vast literature modelling incomplete contracts and …rm boundaries, based on the seminal works of Williamson (1971 Williamson ( , 1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) . For some surveys, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) , Whinston (2001) , Joskow (2005) , Helpman (2006) , 5 institutional frictions. In particular, Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) are the …rst to empirically investigate the combined impact of …nancial and contracting institutions on vertical integration decisions, …nding vertical integration to be positively correlated with the interaction term between contracting institutions and …nancial frictions. From a slightly di¤erent perspective, Alfaro et al. (2011) …nd that similar levels of protectionism, hence trade institutions, imply also similar levels of vertical integration. Alfaro and Charlton (2009) investigate vertical FDI activities and …nd that these are not explained by host countries'comparative advantages, as a¢ liates tend to be rather proximate to parents both in vertical integration and skill content. Nunn (2007) or Nunn and Tre ‡er (2008) provide instead an empirical support for the main tenets of the literature on the o¤shoring decision, relating the contracting environment of a supplier's inputs to the share of US imports that are intra-…rm.
In a …rst attempt to broaden the scope of the property rights approach, Hart and Holstrom (2010) develop a theoretical model in which assets'ownership implies non-contractible management decisions, thus shifting the focus of the previous literature from the analysis of incentives for relationship-speci…c investments to the organization of management decisions. In a complementary approach, Garicano (2000), Garicano and Hubbard (2007) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004 directly model …rms as knowledge-based hierarchies, where coordinated management decisions are taken on the basis of the available knowledge, considered as an intangible and costly input which is complementary to physical inputs in production processes. In their theoretical framework an organizational structure is hence endogenous and dependent on the costs of acquiring and communicating knowledge among agents involved with di¤erent tasks within the …rm hierarchy.
Related to this literature, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) empirically …nd that exporting …rms increase the number of layers of management as a result of trade liberalization, with a more complex organizational design implying a higher …rm productivity. A relationship between organization and productivity is also present in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) , who …nd that …rms headquartered in high-trust countries are also the ones that are more likely to decentralize decisions, eventually showing higher aggregate productivity thanks to a better reallocation of resources. Country studies for India and US in Bloom at al. (2013) and Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) con…rmed the latter.
All these papers do not however consider the peculiarities of a Business Group, in which vertical integration choices are not necessarily independent from the hierarchical organization of production units along the command chain. 7 Consider for example the case of two ex-ante similar Business Groups present in our dataset: General Motors and Mitsubishi. Both groups have a century-old tradition in the production of motor vehicles in their own country of origin (the US and Japan). Moreover, in 2010 our data report that these two groups have a similar size, as they control 659 and 652 a¢ liates in 54 and 32 countries, respectively. 8 Still, when looking at industrial activities beyond motor vehicles, Mitsubishi Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) , Aghion and Holden (2011) . The o¤shoring decision, instead, has been theoretically studied among others by Grossman and Helpman (2002 , 2004 , 2005 , Antràs (2003) , Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008) . 7 The only attempt we have found to explicitely model a theory of business networks is in Kali (1999; . However, also in his approach Business Groups are the result of either a limited contract enforcement or imperfect capital markets, with their nature thus essentially reconducted to the 'dual'nature of …rm boundaries, without mentioning the implications of …rms'hierarchies. Alternatively, the issue has been considered as yet another aspect of …rms'size in the …nance literature (Acharya, Myers and Rajan, 2011; Zingales, 2001a, 2001b; Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 1999) . 8 Alfaro and Charlton (2009) also recall the GM case and enlist 2,248 'entities' belonging to the GM network in 6 is involved in some ten lines of business (e.g. electronic products, aircraft, shipbuilding, petroleum products, chemical products, primary metals, food & beverages, bank and insurance, real estate), while GM beyond motor vehicles provides only …nancial services for its customers. Accordingly, the a¢ liates of Mitsubishi are able to provide a wider range of intermediate inputs to the group, with …rms typically operating in 3 or 4 main di¤erent industries, whereas the a¢ liates of General Motors seem relatively more focused on one or two main intermediate activities. As a result, the degree of vertical integration is higher for Mitsubishi than GM. Crucially, however, Mitsubishi is signi…cantly less complex in terms of organization, with a much ‡atter hierarchical structure (with no more than 3 levels of hierarchy within the group), while GM is characterized by a deeper (up to 8 levels) and more complex hierarchy of cross-participations in its a¢ liates. Moreover, we also …nd that the labor productivity of a¢ liates belonging to the hierarchically more complex GM group is on average signi…cantly larger than the one of Mitsubishi's a¢ liates.
The latter evidence, showing that vertical integration choices are not independent from decisions on the organization of the hierarchy of …rms across groups, is systematic and statistically signi…cant across our sample once we control for institutional characteristics of the host countries. Also, the …nding that higher levels of complexity in hierarchies, rather than vertical integration levels, are positively associated with the average productivity of a¢ liates operating within a given group (controlling for the location and the main activity of a¢ liates and headquarters) is systematic in our data.
Building on these preliminary insights, we construct three novel metrics to catch the multidimensionality of BGs and derive from them a number of results, con…rming the idea that vertical integration choices are not independent from the hierarchical design of organizations in shaping up Business Groups and their performance.
By nesting an Input-Output matrix that is speci…c for each group structure, we …rst re…ne the notion of vertical integration propensity found in Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) conditional on the quality of institutions, a negative correlation arises between vertical integration and hierarchical complexity: for a given level of …nancial development, more specialized (less integrated) a¢ liates end up within more complex organizational structures. Contractual enforcement yields a similar trade-o¤, but less robust.
Furthermore, relying more speci…cally on the literature on organization and hierarchies, we develop a measure of hierarchical complexity applicable to any hierarchical organization (including Business Groups), which is consistent with the previously quoted theoretical models of knowledge-based hierarchies, where a trade-o¤ can arise between the exploitation of knowledge as an intangible input and its communication along the hierarchy. The measure is retrieved as a variation of the node entropy of a hierarchical graph, and is continuous and additive in the number of levels. In our sample the measure is also Pareto-distributed across groups, in line with the previously mentioned concentration of economic activity in the largest (and organizationally more complex) groups.
In relating these metrics to the productivity of a¢ liates belonging to Business Groups, always controlling for country and industry …xed e¤ects, we …nd a positive relationship between vertical integration and a¢ liates'productivity that however is not robust to the inclusion of a group's hierarchical complexity, with only the latter remaining signi…cantly associated to productivity. This result complements the …ndings of Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012) in the case of US …rms, where much of the correlation between a …rm's performance and its vertical structure fades away when controlling for a generic measure of …rm size. The result is also consistent with the theoretical rationale provided by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007) , according to which best intangible assets (such as best managers, best managerial practices) can be shared in presence of a larger number of units of production (in our case more complex hierarchies) and hence their cost can be smoothed on a larger scale. 9
The relevance of intangible assets is also con…rmed by the fact that we …nd the relationship between hierarchical complexity and productivity to be non-linear: above a certain threshold of complexity (around 550 a¢ liates and/or 5 levels of control) the relationship becomes negative. This result is in line with the microfoundation provided by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) , in which a minimum e¢ cient scale exists in the acquisition and communication of knowledge throughout the hierarchy, associated however to the emergence of endogenous communication costs of additional management layers, which should increase with complexity. Such an evidence of marginally decreasing returns from increasing complexity is relevant, as it puts a natural limit to the growth in complexity of Business Groups: indeed, only 1% of groups in our sample exceed this average 'optimal'organizational threshold.
When distinguishing between hierarchical complexity (which takes into account the overall density of a¢ liates at each level of the control hierarchy) and the simple hierarchical distance, i.e. the length of the command chain linking each a¢ liate to the parent company, we …nd that the further the …rm is from the decision making center, the lower its level of productivity appears to be; however, the latter result only holds when we control for our main measure of hierarchical complexity. When considering only hierarchical distance in the model (itself a raw proxy of hierarchical complexity), a¢ liates located at further levels of control would actually display higher levels of productivity. Our data are thus consistent with the idea that further layers of management allow for the exploitation of economies of scale for knowledge inputs, and hence a¢ liates belonging to bigger (more complex) networks are relatively more productive. At the same time, once controlling for the overall hierarchical complexity of the group, subsidiaries located at further hierarchical distances from the headquarters discount a higher cost of communication and show (at the margin) a negative productivity premium.
One …nal caveat is worth mentioning: throughout the analysis we have explored the boundaries of Business Groups with respect to the 'make or buy'(vertical integration) decision, which we have then interacted with the extent of hierarchical complexity of the same group. We have instead considered as given the decision on whether to locate production at home or abroad, thus encompassing multinational enterprises as a subset of Business Groups, although in all our analyses we have always controlled for the potentially di¤erent behavior of foreign vs. domestic a¢ liates.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive a general de…nition of Business Groups on the basis of the existing literature and introduce our dataset, providing at the same time some stylized facts. In Section 3 we construct our metrics of vertical integration and hierarchical complexity and describe their properties. Section 4 relates our metrics of group boundaries to the home and host countries institutions in which BGs operate, as well as to the performance of a¢ liate …rms within groups. Section 5 presents further lines of research and concludes.
2 The nature of Business Groups
De…nition of Business Group
A commonly accepted de…nition of Business Groups does not exist in the economic or business literature, with Williamson (1975) already hinting at the fact that BGs should be located somewhere between markets and hierarchies. 10 In their survey article, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) consider Business Groups as operating in multiple and often unrelated markets, but observe that they are formed by clusters of legally distinct …rms with a common management, a characteristic that makes them di¤erent from multidivisional forms of organization. The …nance literature emphasizes the groups'pyramidal structure built by a controlling shareholder through a chain of equity ties, and the possible con ‡icts of interests arising with minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006) . The focus of the industrial organization literature is instead on the creation of production chains through vertical integration within and across industries (see for example the survey by Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) or, in the case of international trade, through o¤shoring to foreign countries (among others Antràs, 2003; Grossman and Helpman, 2004) . The phenomenon of BGs has also been extensively explored by the business literature, with a variety of di¤erent de…nitions summarized by Colpan and Hikino (2010) .
In this paper we argue that the lowest common denominator of all existing approaches is rooted in the nature of Business Groups as hybrid organizations of economic activities, halfway between markets and hierarchies. As such, BGs are able to exchange intermediate goods and services on the market, but possibly through a transfer price; they can relocate …nancial resources across a¢ liates, but at more favorable conditions if confronted with external …nancing, via the development of internal capital markets; they coordinate management decisions through majority stakes in controlled assets, but have to consider as well minority shareholders'protection. More generally, they have a ‡exible form of assets'ownership that provides at the same time incentives to self-enforce promises of cooperation among a¢ liates, given the control exerted by a common parent, without giving up the advantage (if and when necessary) of organizing activities within a market-like environment, since each a¢ liate maintains formal property rights on its production assets. 11 We can thus de…ne a Business Group as a set of at least two legally autonomous …rms whose economic activity is coordinated through some form of hierarchical control via equity stakes. Legal autonomy and hierarchy are jointly constituent attributes of BGs, distinguishing them from independent …rms (as these are legally autonomous but operate without impending hierarchies) and from multidivisional …rms (which are organized through internal hierarchies of branches, but without autonomous legal status). 12
Given the requirement of hierarchical control, our de…nition rules out strategic business alliances but includes in principle joint ventures, since their assets are owned (and controlled) by more than one proprietary …rm. Under this general de…nition, multinational enterprises (MNEs) can also be considered as a special case of Business Groups, since they have by de…nition at least one legally autonomous a¢ liate located abroad, ultimately controlled by a parent located in the origin country.
In the case instead of economic entities with more than one productive plant (multi-plant …rms), if all plants are commanded by the same …rm under a single legal status we consider them as branches of that …rm, as plants have no form of control on the production assets. On the other hand, if a plant has autonomous legal status, we consider it as an autonomous …rm, thus either independent or an a¢ liate to a Business Group.
Our de…nition is wide enough to include either very simple groups with two …rms, a parent and one a¢ liate, or very complex groups with hundreds of domestic and/or foreign a¢ liates linked by hierarchical control. Hence, for the sake of generality, we rule out any ad hoc de…nition in terms of minimum number of a¢ liates or industries, as found in some management or business literature (e.g. Colpan and Hikino, 2010) .
Data
Having de…ned a Business Group as a combination of …rms with autonomous legal status under some form of hierarchical control, the main di¢ culty in identifying BGs is related to the notion of control exerted by a parent on a¢ liates. We opt here for a de…nition of control as established in international standards for multinational corporations (OECD 2005; UNCTAD, 2009; Eurostat, 1 1 To this end, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2001, 2002) introduce the notion of relational contract: the decision to integrate or not is seen as dynamic in nature, as a repeated game subordinated to the establishment of the parties'long term relationship. From this perspective, the emergence of Business Groups can be seen as a way to establish a superior relational contract, which facilitates integration or non-integration whenever needed.
1 2 The notions of branches/divisions and subsidiaries/a¢ liates tend to overlap in some contexts. In this paper, in accordance with international standards (for example UNCTAD, 2009) we de…ne a branch as a new location, division, department or o¢ ce that is set up by a corporation, yet still within the original company's legal boundary. We will alternatively use the term subsidiary or a¢ liate for a legally independent company controlled by a parent.
2007), where control is assumed if (directly or indirectly, e.g. via another controlled a¢ liate) the parent exceeds the majority (50.01%) of voting rights of the a¢ liate and can thus be considered as the Ultimate Controlling Institution / Ultimate Bene…cial Owner. 13 Such a notion of control is not exhaustive, as it leaves outside the boundaries of BGs a¢ liates de facto controlled through minority ownership (<50%), or peculiar forms of control derived by some form of market advantage (e.g. a monopsony), as well as particular forms of government regulations (e.g. 'golden shares'). Yet, it has some clear advantages. First, the majority (50.01%) of voting rights' criterion creates a unique standard for both domestic and multinational Business Groups. Second, it allows to rule out cases of double (or triple) accounting of a¢ liates among di¤erent groups, thus generating a de…nition of the boundaries of a BG which is univocal (technically, each of our Business Groups is a closed set). Third, such a de…nition of control allows for a straightforward comparison with o¢ cial statistics, as the majority of voting rights is the criterion commonly used in international standards on foreign a¢ liates (Eurostat or OECD FATS) and for international tax purposes (IAS, IFRS). 14 Not all …rms in our dataset report a complete set of …nancial data. Moreover, country-level data for some institutional variables we use as controls are not available for every country. Hence, while we discuss here the complete dataset to introduce stylized facts on Business Groups, in our empirical strategies we rely on a restricted sample of data in which both …rm-level and country-level information are available. The restricted dataset still encompasses 208,181 headquarters (groups) controlling a total of 1,005,381 a¢ liates in some 129 countries. The general properties of the data described here also hold for the restricted sample of Business Groups.
In Table 1 we provide a geographical coverage of the whole sample by some main countries/areas.
The headquarters of Business Groups (parents) are classi…ed by their home country in the second column, while in the third column we report the total number of a¢ liates they control worldwide, either domestically or abroad, a distinction provided respectively in column 4 (domestic a¢ liates) and 5 (a¢ liates abroad, i.e. outward FDI by parents). In the last column we report the foreign a¢ liates located in the area, resulting from inward FDI. Two thirds of Business Groups are originated in OECD economies, with those headquarters controlling around 75% of a¢ liates recorded in our data (66% of which are domestic). Headquarters located in countries of the European Union, in particular, control 48% of total a¢ liates, of which roughly one third (259,278) are located abroad. The situation is di¤erent in the US, where around 46% of the a¢ liates controlled by American headquarters are located abroad. Developing countries, not surprisingly, have a larger share of domestic groups, with about 80% of the 371,577 a¢ liates controlled by non-OECD headquarters located domestically.
Confronting the last two columns of Table 1 , we can see how the OECD countries attract the vast majority (70%) of the 465,928 foreign a¢ liates recorded in our data. We also observe a positive di¤erence between outward and inward FDI stock (as proxied by number of a¢ liates) in developed economies, in particular in the case of US and Japan, where the number of a¢ liates located abroad outnumbers respectively more than twofold and fourfold the number of foreign a¢ liates located in the economy. European Union members seem an exception, but in that case it is intra-EU FDI activities that makes the net position almost in balance. In developing countries the inward FDI stock of …rms is almost twice as large as the outward one. Only selected countries/areas are reported. Totals refer to all countries present in the complete sample.
To validate our dataset we can rely on few references since, to the best of our knowledge, there is no similar dataset covering control chains of corporate activities both domestically and abroad for all countries of the world. One partial exception is the World Investment Report of UNCTAD, which compiles yearly a list of the biggest corporations currently operating in the world, all present in our dataset with their a¢ liates. UNCTAD (2011) Finally, an indirect validation of the data is reported in Altomonte et al. (2012) . In that paper, the authors have matched transaction-and …rm-level data for France to the ownership structure of companies as derived from our dataset, in order to estimate the amount of intra-…rm (intra-group) and arm's length (non intra-group) exports of French …rms to the US in 2009. Looking at the counterfactual of o¢ cial data on US intra-…rm and arms'length imports from France, as retrieved from the US Census Bureau, the two trade ‡ows turned out to match very closely. Table 2 shows how …rms that are a¢ liated to Business Groups are on average bigger than non-a¢ liated …rms along di¤erent dimensions (see Appendix A for information on the control group of non-a¢ liated …rms): they employ on average 88% more workers, their sales are larger, they are usually more capitalintensive and almost twice more pro…table. They are also 4% more productive, even after controlling for size and capital-intensity. Moreover, a¢ liation premia do not display dramatic di¤erences between OECD and non-OECD economies.
Stylized facts on Business Groups
In addition to the superior performance of BGs'a¢ liates, another typical characteristic found in the literature on heterogeneous …rms is the remarkable skewness of the underlying distributions. In terms of hierarchies, the left panel of Figure 3 shows that 57% of …rms in our dataset represent very simple organizations consisting of one headquarter and one a¢ liate, while about 13% of groups have Binary regressions with country-per-industry …xed e¤ects; **, *** stand for signi…cance respectively at 5% and 1%; (1) Capital-intensity and size added as a further control for a one-factor measure of productivity. See Appendix A for details on the control group of non-a¢ liated …rms.
more than …ve a¢ liates and only 0.7% of headquarters control more than 100 a¢ liates. However, the right panel of Figure 3 also shows that those 0.7% of groups with more than 100 a¢ liates are responsible for more than 70% of value added recorded in our data.
The skewness in the distribution is in any case heterogeneous across countries, as shown in Table   3 . US corporate groups tend to be larger, with an average size of 21 a¢ liates against a total average of 5, with largest groups operating in the …nancial industry and some in manufacturing. In Asian countries (Japan, China and the ASEAN region) we also detect the existence of conglomerates with a higher number of a¢ liates on each percentile of the distribution, as well as groups that tend to be internally engaged in all sectors of economic activities, from manufacturing to services. 19 In the case of Africa and Middle East, on the other hand, most of the bigger groups are active in the extraction of natural resources and related activities. European groups are on average smaller in terms of number of a¢ liates but there is a considerable di¤erence between northern countries (Germany, Sweden, Finland, France) and southern countries (Italy and Spain), with the BGs originating from 'core'Europe being usually bigger than the ones originated in Southern Europe.
In the next sections we rely on the property rights theory of the …rm and try to make sense of such a cross-country heterogeneity by linking some speci…c characteristics of Business Groups to the host countries'institutional environment. In absence of actual data on internal shipments of intermediate goods and services across …rms, AJM (2009) proposed to proxy vertical integration exploiting the information on the set of industries in which a …rm is engaged, combined with the input coe¢ cient requirements that link those industries as retrieved from input-output tables (see also Alfaro et al., 2011) . A …rm-level index was therefore calculated summing up all input-output coe¢ cients that linked each …rm's primary activity to the secondary activities in which it was involved. The assumption is thus that a …rm engaged in more industries, where backward and forward linkages in production are important, is supposed to have a higher capacity to source internally more inputs for its …nal output. 21 In deriving these results, AJM(09) have however treated each …rm in their sample as independent, that is neglecting the possibility that the degree of vertical integration can be a function of the coordinated management decision of a Business Group, where the decision to "make or buy" can be di¤erentiated between headquarters and a¢ liates or across the same a¢ liates, as shown by the GM vs. Mitsubishi example reported in Introduction.
To take into account the latter dimension, we have slightly re…ned the original AJM(09) index of vertical integration. First, we consider two layers of integration: the group-level, which is the result of all production activities performed by a¢ liates and headquarter altogether; and the a¢ liate-level, that is the propensity of each a¢ liate to exchange intermediates within the network represented by the group. Second, we take into account the number of lines of business in which a BG and its constituent …rms can be involved.
In particular, we assume that within a group two sets of activities can be identi…ed: a set of output With these assumptions, we can build a group-speci…c input-output table as the one illustrated in Figure 4 , where we report outputs in columns and inputs by row and where each combination V I ij is the ith coe¢ cient requirement to produce the jth output.
2 0 They also found that the impact of contractual frictions was more important in industries where holdup problems were more relevant. Hence, once industrial composition was accounted for, they concluded that some countries with a generalized problem of contractual incompleteness simply specialize in sectors where more vertical integration naturally occurs, that is in sectors where technologies are less advanced. By summing up input coe¢ cient requirements by column in Figure 4 we obtain the vertical integration for each line of business in which the Business Group is involved. 23 To retrieve the vertical integration index for the whole group, we average the total of all input coe¢ cient requirements (V I ij ) by the number of output activities (jN H j), thus correcting for the potential conglomerate nature of the group.
The result is the following group-speci…c (g) vertical integration index:
where V I ij are the input coe¢ cient requirements for any output activity j 2 N H sourcing from all input activities j 2 N A . The group-speci…c vertical integration index can range from 0 to 1, where 1 corresponds to complete vertical integration.
The latter however does not capture the full picture of a BG's possible spectrum of choices in 2 2 As in AJM(09), the use of the US input-output table for all countries is justi…ed by the assumption that there is a correlation in the input use patterns across countries. More in general, at the basis of the use of a common input-output table there are the assumptions of a common technology frontier and either of a Leontief production function or of factor price equalization.de…ning its boundaries. In fact, Business Groups could report similar levels of vertical integration at the level of headquarters, but they can organize each a¢ liate in a more or less integrated way, according to the organizational structure of the group across industries. The latter is the case of GM vs. Mitsubishi: as discussed, the former is a relatively specialized group, while the Japanese conglomerate is involved in more than ten lines of business. And yet, calculating an index of vertical integration at the level of headquarters as above (v g ) would yield similar results across the two groups.
The reason is that a¢ liates in these two groups have themselves di¤erent degrees of vertical integration, which 'compensate'for the ex-ante di¤erent diversi…cation of the headquarters'activities (a¢ liates of Mitsubishi tend to be bigger and active in more diversi…ed sourcing industries then the ones of GM).
It then follows that estimating vertical integration in a sample that considers each BG's a¢ liate as an independent …rm would clearly miss the structural correlation linking a¢ liates belonging to the same group, thus generating potentially biased results. This is an important feature of Business Groups'boundaries which has been previously neglected in the analyses on vertical integration.
To better gauge the di¤erences in vertical integration strategies across BGs, we thus integrate the group-index of vertical integration with a measure calculated directly at the individual a¢ liate level.
Here we consider primary or secondary activities of the single a¢ liate as intermediate inputs that can be supplied potentially to all other co-a¢ liates and to the headquarters, and reclassify them according to the main industries reported in Appendix B. We end up with the following a¢ liate-speci…c (v a ) index of vertical integration:
where the input coe¢ cient requirements (V I ij ) are taken for any ith among single a¢ liate activities (N a N A ) that can lend to any jth main activity performed by the headquarter (N H ). Averaging by the number of main industries in which the single a¢ liate is involved allows again to correct for the potential conglomerate nature of the a¢ liate itself. In a nutshell, going back to Figure 4 , this time we sum up coe¢ cient requirements by row, then averaging by the number of rows. As well as for the previous group-speci…c index, the a¢ liate-level index can range from 0 to 1 and it can be interpreted as the propensity of an a¢ liate to be vertically integrated with the rest of the group.
Both the group-and a¢ liate-speci…c indexes of vertical integration are additive on industries but not on production units: a new industry adds to the sum of input-output coe¢ cients however small its contribution can be to the …nal output, but more …rms can be involved in the same industry. For these reasons, we expect the group-level index of vertical integration to be higher than the same index calculated at the a¢ liate-level. In Figure 5 we report the sample distributions of both indices.
In our dataset the average vertical integration across groups (v g ) is .062 (that is, on average 6 cents worth of inputs are sourced within groups for a one dollar unit of output), while the same which is similar to the one we obtain for groups. Similarly to Alfaro et al. (2011) , both distributions of our vertical integration indexes show long right-tails. In our case about 1,3% of Business Groups can potentially source internally more than 50% of the value of their output, while only about 0.8% of groups have a¢ liates that, individually taken, have vertical integration indexes in excess of 0.5.
Hierarchical complexity
A particularly convenient property of representing Business Groups as hierarchical graphs, as in Figure   1 , is that it is possible to provide a synthetic measure of their organization through some hierarchical form of entropy. We can thus proxy the process of coordinated management that occurs within the hierarchy of …rms in a BG by exploiting the information on the command chain that links single a¢ liates to the ultimate headquarter.
Borrowing from graph theory, the entropy of a hierarchical graph G characterized by a total of L levels of hierarchies can be constructed by assigning a discrete probability distribution p : L ! [0; 1] to every level l in the hierarchy, where the probability p l = n l N is a function of the n l number of nodes on each level l and the total number of nodes N , yielding a measure of node entropy
which is speci…c for hierarchical graphs (Emmert-Streib and Dehmer, 2007) . 24 The H(G) measure of entropy is characterized by some useful properties: a) it is continuous; b) it is additive in L, so that each level l (order) of nodes can be considered a subsystem of the whole graph G; c) the measure is maximal when all the outcomes are equally likely, i.e.there is an equal number of 2 4 De…ning p l = n l N implicitly exploits a fundamental postulate in statistical mechanics or thermodynamics according to which the occupation of any state is assumed to be equally probable. Also note that this formula uses a base-2 logarithm, rather than the natural log, in order to obtain positive marginal complexity for n l > 1. nodes on each level l. Finally, the logarithmic entropy is also symmetric, meaning that the measure is unchanged if levels L are re-ordered.
The symmetry of the measure is however an unpleasant property when applied to the case of Business Groups, since it implies that adding one node (a¢ liate) to the network increases its complexity independently from the hierarchical level at which the node is added, that is
with m 6 = n being two di¤erent hierarchical levels. The latter is counter-intuitive in the case of a hierarchical organization characterized by a headquarter, because one might expect that the degree of coordination of the whole control chain (its 'complexity') should increase relatively more when a¢ liates are incorporated at proprietary levels more distant from the vertex.
For this reason we have re…ned the original H(G) formula introducing an additional weight to the probability distribution of levels more distant from the parent. After some straightforward manipulations we can rewrite our node entropy measure for Business Groups, which we refer to as 'Group Index of Complexity'(GIC), as:
where as before the measure is a function of the n l number of a¢ liates on a given hierarchical level l, of the total number N of a¢ liates belonging to the group and of the total number of levels (L).
The index can theoretically range within the [0; +1) interval, with zero now indicating a very simple organization in which a headquarter controls one or more a¢ liates located just one level of control below (l = 1). Moreover, the index retains some desirable properties of the original node entropy, as it is (logarithmically) increasing in the number of hierarchical levels. We provide some detailed statistical properties of the GIC in Appendix C.
Importantly for our purposes, and contrary to the original hierarchical entropy measure H(G), the GIC now allows to take into account the marginal increase in complexity brought about by a¢ liates added to lower hierarchical levels, since @GIC @pm > @GIC @pn for m < n (with p n;m being the usual probability measures de…ned above), provided that n l > l. More speci…cally, the logarithmic weight assigned to the probability term p = n l N of every level is such to increase the measure of complexity when more subsidiaries are included at di¤ erent lower levels of distance, while the function is decreasing at the margin when a¢ liates are added at the same level. 25 The economic rationale for a decreasing marginal complexity when a¢ liates are added at the same hierarchical level is associated to the idea that some economies of scale intervene when …rms expand their network of a¢ liates horizontally, while coordination (and communication) costs can become more and more important once the network enlarges and deepens by locating a¢ liates to further levels from the headquarter. This is in line with the literature on knowledge-based hierarchies (see for example Garicano, 2000, or more recently Caliendo and , according to which the optimal design of a management hierarchy is the result of a trade-o¤ between knowledge and communication.
A further layer of management increases the utilization of knowledge, for which some economies of scale are assumed, but at the same time it also increases the cost of communication along the hierarchy. Accordingly, in our case the hierarchical distance from the headquarter implies a higher '…xed cost' of communication (hence our correction for node entropy in eq. 4), while further a¢ liates on the same level imply a decreasing 'marginal cost'of knowledge. As a result, the hierarchical complexity of an object such as a Business Group cannot simply be proxied by its total number of a¢ liates N or by its number of hierarchical levels, with the index of complexity being not strictly monotonous in N .
In Appendix C we provide further evidence of the sample comparison between a groups' number of a¢ liates and our index of complexity.
Another way to measure the complexity of the hierarchy developed by a Business Group could be the explicit introduction of an edge entropy, i.e. considering the strength of the cross participations as a further dimension to be included in the entropy index. In this case, the index would di¤er if an a¢ liate can be …nally owned through direct participation (held by the headquarter) or indirect cross participations (held by any other a¢ liates in the control chain). 26 However, given the scope of our analysis, the latter would not yield qualitatively di¤erent results, as we only use data on Business Groups characterized by a majority threshold for control that includes direct and indirect equity ties, in line with international business statistics. In terms of interpretation, that is equivalent to assume that, once the group boundaries are identi…ed through control, any share above such a threshold would not signi…cantly a¤ect the complexity of the organization, as the headquarter would retain in any case the decision power.
Vertical Integration and Hierarchical Complexity across Countries and Industries
In Table 4 we report sample averages of both the Group Index of Complexity (GIC) and the grouplevel vertical integration (VPI), for some selected industries and geographical areas. The industry is identi…ed as the core sector where the majority of value added is created within the Business Group, even though many larger BGs can be involved in more than one line of business. The country is instead the home country where the headquarter is located, even though the group can have some a¢ liates abroad.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 show that, while group-level vertical integration is constantly lower for OECD economies with respect to non-OECD economies for each reported industry, the opposite is true for hierarchical complexity. Groups originated in the US are the ones showing higher …gures for hierarchical complexity in most industries, while Japanese groups display instead lower delegation of control (they are hierarchically less complex). The …gures for developing economies show instead a higher variation across industries.
As expected, the less integrated among the reported industries is the category of business services which rely less on physical inputs, while the most integrated groups can be found in the chemical industry. The automotive industry, from which we derived the case studies of General Motors and Mitsubishi sketched in the introduction, appears to be relatively less integrated than expected thanks 2 6 In this case we could modify the index considering a joint probability distribution pij = p with e l number of edges at level l and E total number of graph edges. The two events'probabilities can be assumed as mutually independent, and hence we obtain the following index GIC = P E i P L J pij log (1=pij) where @GIC @p ij < 0; with n l ; e l 2 N and n l > 1; e l > 1, obtaining a decreasing marginal complexity in both nodes and edges, provided that we have at least one subsidiary and one control link on each level.
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to the presence of some very specialized small groups active in the provision of parts and components.
Indeed, looking at the automotive industry in US and Japan, the preliminary evidence of the case studies is con…rmed on industry aggregates, since the hierarchical complexity of the US car industry is higher than Japan. However, …gures for vertical integration suggest that Japanese automotive groups exchange intermediates internally on average four times more than the US ones do.
Overall, cross-country variation seems to dominate cross-industry variation, especially when looking at …gures of hierarchical complexities. Based on this evidence, in the next section we explore the relationship between group boundaries and country-level institutional determinants, controlling for the residual sectorial heterogeneity via …xed e¤ects. Sample averages for group integration (v g ) and Group Index of Complexity (GIC). Industries are identi…ed as the core activity where most value added is created. Countries as the origin of the parent company.
4 Empirical results
Group boundaries and institutions
We begin our analysis by applying the empirical strategy developed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) to our group-speci…c and a¢ liate-speci…c measures of vertical integration, then adding a control for the group-speci…c hierarchical complexity.
In particular we assume that a Business Group decides the organization of production activities in two stages: …rst the group decides how much total vertical integration it wants to achieve. 27 Then, in a second stage, managers decide how to achieve the desired degree of vertical integration, distributing it between a¢ liates and headquarters and across a¢ liates, also based on the underlying hierarchical structure in which a¢ liates are placed. 28 We thus test for the drivers of Business Groups'boundaries in nested steps: …rst we consider the drivers of group-level vertical integration; then we test for vertical integration at the a¢ liate level, given the choice of vertical integration at the group-level; further, we control for the level of hierarchical complexity of the group to which the a¢ liate belongs.
In the …rst speci…cation, we take as a dependent variable the measure of group-level vertical integration (v gkc ) introduced in the previous section, which is speci…c for each group g located in country c and operating in a core industry k:
In this model, X cg and Z cg are the two proxies for country-level contract enforcement and …nancial Three controls for the characteristics of business groups are included. The …rst is a proxy for the group size (employment, emp g ), obtained either directly from the headquarters' balance sheet consolidated data, if available, or calculated summing up the employees of the headquarters and a¢ liates. The second control is our entropy-like measure for hierarchical complexity (GIC g ), which controls for the fact that a higher level of vertical integration might be correlated to a more or less complex corporate structure. Finally, a binary variable (mne g ) controls whether or not each Business Group owns a¢ liates operating outside from his home country.
As in Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009), we also control for the potential endogeneity of institutions to development, through the (log of) GDP per capita (gdpc cg ) of the country where the headquarter is located, assumed to be the country of origin (home country) of the business group.
A set of 3-digit NAICS industry …xed e¤ects ( k ) is added to exclude that our results are the consequence of a peculiar industrial composition. On that, note that even though Business Groups can be active in more than one industry, we assign each group to the core 3-digit activity of their headquarters, that is one of the activities which we have used as outputs in our index of vertical integration where most of the value added is generated. Errors are clustered by country, and variables are standardized to obtain beta coe¢ cients. Nested results are reported in Table 5 .
Results show that contracting and …nancial conditions on a country-level are both signi…cantly and separately correlated with a group's vertical integration, even after controlling for industrial composition. We …nd in particular that a better contract enforcement reduces the scope for vertical integration, since in this case Business Groups can rely on external suppliers for the provision of inputs with a lower probability that they renege on commitments. Similarly, our results also show that a higher level of …nancial development reduces the necessity to internalize production activities:
as credit constraints are less stringent thanks to the availability of better capital markets, outsourcing outside the boundaries of the group is the preferred strategy. estimates were correctly signed (as in our case) but individually not-signi…cant. We believe this di¤erence in results is due to our choice of explicitly considering group a¢ liation in the construction of the vertical integration index. 31 Finally, we also …nd that the level of total integration is not di¤erent for multinational and domestic BGs, as the control in the last column of Table 5 con…rms, which further strenghtens the idea that the home country institutional environment is a powerful driver of the organization of a Business Group.
Given the ability of Business Groups to design vertical integration also across a¢ liates, we nest the above results in the vertical integration choice of each a¢ liate, by estimating the following equation:
where in this case we take as dependent variable the a¢ liate-speci…c (a) vertical integration within the gth group (v a(g)kca ), de…ned in Equation (2) as the average propensity to ship intermediate inputs within the group network.
Each a¢ liate is characterized by a core activity (k), where we assume most of value added is created (even though the a¢ liate can be involved in more than one primary and/or secondary activities), and by a country (c a ) in which the a¢ liate is located, possibly di¤erent from the country of origin of the Business Group, in which case we will be dealing with a foreign a¢ liate. 32 Hence, the set of proxies of institutional frictions (X ca , Z ca ), their interaction and the (log) of GDP per capita (gdpc ca ) now all refer to the a¢ liate hosting country.
The inclusion of both the group index of complexity (GIC g ) and the group vertical integration (v g ) as covariates is crucial in our setting to comprehend how business groups solve the trade-o¤ between vertical integration at the headquarter vs. a¢ liate-level within a given institutional setting. For this, we will also interact these two covariates with our proxies of institutional frictions.
Group-level and a¢ liate-level employment (emp a , emp g ) in logs are also added as controls, as well as a set of NAICS 3-digit industry …xed e¤ects ( k ) that take into account potential di¤erences in the industrial composition of the sample, while errors are clustered by country. Results are reported in Table 6 .
Similar to the results of the group-level speci…cation, we observe that the a¢ liate-level vertical integration is negatively correlated with contract enforcement and …nancial development: better institutions not only reduce the scope for total vertical integration, but also allow single a¢ liates to be relatively more specialized in the production of fewer inputs required by common production processes.
We also …nd that, on average, a¢ liate and group integration are positively correlated, as similar environments lead the single a¢ liate to resemble the parent group when designing its boundary, in line with the …ndings of Atalay et al. (2012) .
The negative signs in the interaction terms between group integration and institutional quality measures (column 5) point however to the idea that the better the institutions in a country, the higher factors can be complementary in the choice of the organizational form, since …rms face a credit constraint when investing in a contractual relationship with suppliers and thus, credit markets being imperfect, even in presence of a low cost of contracting, important …nancial frictions can lead to a choice of vertical integration. On the other hand, the …nance literature arrives at di¤erent conclusions: higher …nancial development implies either less or more integration depending on how authors proxy integration (…rm size, layers of management). 3 2 In Table 7 we will speci…cally test for the robustness of our results when dealing with foreign a¢ liates only. *, **, *** signi…cance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Beta coe¢ cients, errors clustered by country.
is the ‡exibility of a group in selecting the degree of specialization of its a¢ liates. In other words, in 'good'institutional environments a¢ liates are relatively less similar in terms of vertical integration with respect to their group: a higher contract enforcement and/or a better …nancial development allow the single a¢ liate to specialize more with respect to the group to which it belongs, thus exchanging fewer inputs within the same group.
Finally, in column 6 of Table 6 , we introduce as a further control our metric of hierarchical complexity and its interaction with institutions. Results point at a potential trade-o¤ between integration and complexity in the organizational design of a Business Group's boundaries: controlling for the level of …nancial development in the host country, a group's vertical integration and a group's hierarchical complexity have a di¤erent impact (one negative, the other positive) on the degree of vertical integration of each a¢ liate. In other words, controlling for institutions, a given level of integration achieved by a¢ liates stems from an alternative combination of vertical integration and hierarchy in the group.
These results are in line with the case study of GM vs. Mitsubishi, in which di¤erent degrees of a¢ liates' integration can be associated to similar levels of group integration only since hierarchical complexity varies across the two groups (with GM's a¢ liates being placed in a relatively more complex hierarchical structure). 33 The latter …ndings con…rms the idea that within Business Groups vertical integration choices are not independent from decisions on the organization of the hierarchy of …rms across groups. Ignoring this latent organizational variable when checking for the drivers of vertical integration of …rms, as well as the correlation between group and a¢ liate levels of vertical integration (e.g. considering all …rms as independent in a sample) might thus lead to an omitted variable bias.
In Table 7 we present some tests of sensitivity of our results. In the …rst column, as already discussed, we reproduce for our sample the original methodology by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) . That is, we calculate the index of vertical integration for each …rm as in AJM (09), i.e. assuming that each …rm's primary activities are its outputs while its secondary activities are internally produced inputs, but ignoring the property linkages among …rms as well as its position in the hierarchy of the BG, thus considering each …rm as independent. Results show that, as expected, when omitting the Business Group dimension the model is less well speci…ed, and thus institutional variables lose signi…cance.
In the second column of Table 7 we restrict our sample only to a¢ liates with more than 20 employees, in order to check if previous results are driven by the presence of a larger set of small …rms, in which vertical integration can be assumed to be negligible. Coe¢ cients remain very similar to previous results also in magnitude. In the third column we exclude the simplest Business Groups characterized by only one a¢ liate and one headquarter, to verify the extent to which results are driven by the relatively large presence of groups of this kind in our sample: results are quite stable and all previous comments can be considered valid.
Findings are also robust (albeit slightly less signi…cant) also when considering separately foreign a¢ liates, as shown in the fourth column of Table 7 . Part of this loss of signi…cance can be explained by the smaller variance we notice in the subsample of foreign a¢ liates, since they are more similar than domestic a¢ liates in terms of vertical integration. On the other hand, with respect to the average a¢ liate in our sample, a¢ liates of multinational corporations might be more in ‡uenced by organizational strategies developed in their country of origin, and hence relatively less in ‡uenced in their organizational design by the host country characteristics measured in this exercise. *, **, *** signi…cance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Beta coe¢ cients, errors clustered by country.
Group boundaries and performance
Another interesting dimension in the analysis of Business Groups is the relationship between vertical integration and productivity. Recently Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012) have empirically investigated US plant-level data showing that vertically integrated plants have on average higher productivity levels. They also …nd that this productivity premium re ‡ects a cherry-picking e¤ect, with already more e¢ cient plants integrated ex post into more vertical structures. 34 Consistently with these …ndings, in Table 2 we have shown that also in our dataset …rms that are a¢ liated to Business Groups (and thus to some extent vertically integrated) are on average bigger and more productive than non-a¢ liated …rms. What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which di¤erent levels of vertical integration map into a di¤erent productivity of a¢ liates, considering that vertical integration for Business Groups is a multi-dimensional concept (at the headquarters vs.
a¢ liates' level, and across a¢ liates distributed along more or less complex hierarchies). To explore these issues, we test whether the productivity levels of BGs'a¢ liates are systematically correlated to vertical integration and/or hierarchical complexity of the group, controlling for a number of additional groups'characteristics.
In our speci…cation we take as dependent variable (the log of) labor productivity (prod a(g)kca )
calculated as value added per employee of each a¢ liate a belonging to the gth group, operating in core industry k and located in country c a .
A¢ liate-level and group-level vertical integration (v a(g)kca , v g ), as well as hierarchical complexity (GIC g ) with = 1; 2 are included as covariates, together with the hierarchical distance (hdist a(g)kca )
of each a¢ liate a within group g. The latter is the level at which the single …rm is located within the network of a¢ liates that form a Business Group, as depicted in Figure 1 , and can be interpreted as a control for the communication ability of the a¢ liate with the center of decision represented by the headquarter. Controls for capital intensity and size at the a¢ liate level (emp a(j)kca , kl a(j)kca ) correct for the possible bias deriving from the use of a one-factor productivity indicator, at the same time controlling for relation-speci…c investments that a …rm with a higher capital-intensive production can undertake. Total employment is included as a control at the level of the group (emp g ), together
with a full set of (country-per-industry) …xed e¤ects ( kc ), in order to neutralize at this stage of the analysis all possible di¤erences in institutional environments combined with industrial composition (here considered at the 3 digit level of disaggregation), and thus isolate as much as possible the e¤ects of organizational design on a¢ liates' performance. Errors are clustered at the headquarter level, to account for within-group correlation. Nested results are presented in Table 8 .
Looking at results, when we do not control for country …xed e¤ects, as in the …rst column of Table 8 , we obtain a negative correlation between vertical integration and productivity, both at the group-and at the a¢ liate-level. This is because, as also shown by Table 4 , Business Groups and their constituent …rms are more vertically integrated in developing economies, where institutional frictions are more present and …rm performance is on average lower than in developed economies. On the other hand, including country …xed e¤ects but excluding industry …xed e¤ects (column 2 of Table 8 ), we …nd a positive correlation between both indexes of vertical integration and productivity, although in this case several omitted variables can bias the correlation, among which the degree of market competition and the speci…c contractual completeness of the industry in which the …rms operate. This is why starting from column 3 we include country-per-industry …xed e¤ects.
Controlling for country-level heterogeneity combined with industrial composition (column 3), we …nd that only a¢ liate vertical integration is associated to average a¢ liates'productivity, while group integration is not signi…cant. The latter result is con…rmed also controlling for foreign a¢ liates (which in turn, consistently with other …ndings in the literature, are found to be some 25% more productive than the average …rm).
When also controlling for the hierarchic organization of the group (column 4), we …nd that all the measures of vertical integration lose both signi…cance and magnitude, while hierarchical complexity appears to be positively and signi…cantly related to productivity. This result is partially in line with the evidence provided by Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012) in the case of US data, according to which much of the positive correlation between plant performance and vertical ownership structures fades away when controlling for …rm size as proxied by total revenues, employment or number of establishments. However, di¤erently from Atalay et al. (2012) , in our strategy we distinguish between actual (a¢ liate or group) size, measured by (a¢ liate or group) employment in the above speci…cations, and hierarchical complexity, being able to show that also this latter dimension matters for a¢ liates'
productivity. 35 The …nding that the positive correlation between hierarchical complexity and productivity dominates the one between vertical integration and productivity can be related to the theoretical framework developed by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007) , who model …rms as knowledge-based hierarchies. According to this strand of literature, knowledge is a typical intangible asset which is complementary to physical inputs involved in vertically linked products. Knowledge can be accumulated for example by hiring better managers and adopting better managerial procedures, but it has a …xed cost. Therefore, given a …rm size (in our case group size), best intangible assets can be shared in the presence of a larger number of units of production and hence their costs can be smoothed on a larger scale. Our results add to these …ndings, by showing that, within a Business
Group structure, besides the positive relationship between group size and performance, also the complexity of the command chain is positively correlated with productivity. 36 A well designed mechanism for the transmission of knowledge seems here crucial since it allows for an e¢ cient exploitation of intangible assets throughout appropriately designed hierarchies able to decentralize decisions at the level where they are needed.
Unfortunately we have no direct information on the actual delegation of authority occurring within
Business Groups. Still, we can presume that a higher number of layers of management (both in levels and nodes) could imply a more complex /delegated decision process. Under this assumption, our results can then be considered also in line with the …ndings of Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) , according to which more delegation of authority implies a higher …rm-level performance thanks to a better reallocation of resources. 37
Our results also show that too complex an organization can also be problematic. As previously discussed, our measure of hierarchical complexity takes into account the higher …xed costs of communication between the single a¢ liate and the headquarter when more than one layer of management is involved in the decision process. From the point of view of the headquarter, it might be e¢ cient to decentralize decisions at lower levels of hierarchies to better exploit intangible assets, but at the same time, as coordinating a decision with a distant a¢ liate is relatively more cumbersome, internal coordination costs can become so high that the organization becomes too complex to be managed e¢ ciently. To capture this e¤ect, in column 5 of Table 8 we have introduced a squared term in our hierarchical complexity variable, which turns out to be negative and signi…cant. This latter result is in line with the microfoundation of organization provided by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) , in which a minimum e¢ cient scale exists in the acquisition and communication of knowledge throughout the hierarchy, associated to the emergence of endogenous communication costs.
Although we do not have information on a group's minimum e¢ cient scale of production, from our of vertical integration actually occurring within some of their non-independent …rms.
estimates we can calculate the optimal threshold of complexity after which, ceteris paribus, returns from hierarchical complexity start to decrease: this is quite large, as it corresponds to a GIC of around 9.5, associated to groups exceeding the number of 550 a¢ liates and/or organized in control chains with over 5 levels of hierarchical distance. 38 Such an evidence of marginally decreasing returns from increasing complexity is relevant, as it puts a natural limit to the growth in complexity: indeed, only 1% of groups in our sample (the critical value of GIC is around the 99th percentile of its distribution) exceed this average 'optimal'organizational threshold.
Finally, as a robustness check of the theoretical assumption of increasing marginal costs of communication across hierarchical levels, in the last speci…cation of Table 8 we have introduced a control for the simple hierarchical distance of the a¢ liate, i.e. the length of the command chain linking each a¢ liate to the parent company. We …nd that on average the further the …rm is from the decision making center, the lower its level of productivity appears to be. But the latter result only holds when we control at the same time for our measure of hierarchical complexity. When considering only hierarchical distance in the model, i.e. excluding hierarchical complexity, a¢ liates located at further levels of control would actually display higher levels of productivity. This is consistent with the idea that across BGs a¢ liates located at lower hierarchical levels discount a higher positive premium for productivity thanks to the organization e¤ects discussed before, while within BGs (that is, when we do control for hierarchical complexity) the higher marginal costs of internal communication a¤ects the single a¢ liate's performance.
Conclusions
In this paper we have sketched a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon of Business Groups across countries, showing how BGs, although more numerous in developing economies, constitute however a relevant share of economic activities, in terms of both value added generation and trade, also in developed countries.
We have also shown that given their peculiar ownership structure, the most recent tenets of the theory of the …rm and of organizational economics can be nested within Business Group structures, provided that some re…nements to the existing methodologies are taken into account.
To that extent, we have improved upon traditional measures of vertical integration, distinguishing between an a¢ liate-and a group-level propensity to exchange intermediate inputs. We have also discussed why, studying Business Groups, it is necessary to complement these measures with a novel metric able to account for the hierarchical complexity of the command chain linking a¢ liates and headquarters. Our novel metric borrows from graph theory and is consistent with recent works modelling …rms as knowledge-based hierarchies (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Garicano and Hubbard, 2007; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012) .
Through these re…nements, we have shown how the decision process related to the design of boundaries in Business Groups is truly multi-dimensional, as vertical integration choices are not independent from decisions on the organization of management within the hierarchy. Thus, ignoring both the impending ownership structure that links …rms in a common hierarchy and the interplay that occurs between integration and organization might lead to unobserved omitted variable biases, for example when studying the institutional drivers of production networks.
More in particular, our results point at a positive and signi…cant relationship between a¢ liates' productivity and hierarchical complexity which dominates the positive relationship between performance and vertical integration. This …nding is consistent with the theoretical framework by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007) , according to which knowledge is a typical intangible asset complementary to physical inputs involved in vertically linked products, and a higher scale of production allows for a smoothing of its …xed costs thanks to a well designed mechanism of transmission along the hierarchy.
The latter relationship is non-linear in our data, re ‡ecting a trade-o¤ between the accumulation of knowledge and its communication down the hierarchy, a result in line with the work by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) , where internal coordination costs could become too high to e¢ ciently exploit coordinated management decisions. With some caveats due to limitations of our data, we can interpret our results also in the light of the …ndings by Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) , according to which more delegation of power within the …rm is associated with a better allocation of resources.
A number of further lines of research stem from the above analysis. First of all, it is unclear if the correlation between organization and productivity is the result of a cherry-picking process, in which bigger and/or more complex business groups select …rms with the better prospects on the market. To recover some evidence on the latter direction of causality we have used a subset of our data for which we have information on the date of acquisition of a …rm by a Business Group. We have found that the relation holds also using the growth rates of productivity, but due to the persistency over time of the hierarchical complexity variable, more work needs to be undertaken in this direction.
A second line of research should investigate the country and industry variation in BGs' foreign a¢ liates to verify if and how a di¤erential in institutional constraints between origin and host countries can shape organizational designs and …nally a¤ect performance.
A third line of research is related to the exploration of the role of internal capital markets developed by Business Groups for the allocation of …nancial resources among competing investment projects.
Some preliminary evidence we have obtained on our data shows that the possibility to shift …nancial funds across activities and across countries mitigates the …nancial pressures exerted on corporate structures with respect to stand-alone …rms, in line with previous …ndings of the …nance literature.
At the same time, however, we detect a complementarity across BGs between internal capital markets and an enhanced borrowing capacity, probably due to a better reputation that acts as an intangible collateral on credit markets. The latter seems to be particularly relevant in the years of …nancial crisis and as such constitutes a potential channel of competitiveness that is worth further investigation.
Appendix A: Corporate control and Business Groups from the Ownership Database (BvD)
Our two main sources of data are both compiled by Bureau Van Djik (BvD), a Belgian consulting …rm, and comprise the Ownership Database, from which we derive information on intra-group control linkages, and the Orbis database, from which we retrieve companies'balance sheet information.
The Ownership Database, in particular, includes information on over 30 million shareholder/subsidiary links for companies worldwide. Information on proprietary linkages is collected directly from single companies, from o¢ cial bodies when in charge, or from some national and international providers. In Table A .1 we include a list of the information providers, with the indication of the countries/areas they cover, as reported by the Ownership Database. In case of con ‡icting information among providers covering the same country/area, the Ownership Database is updated according to the latest available report.
Among the international providers, Bureau van Djik enlists also Dun & Bradstreet, a data source that has already been exploited in other academic works mentioned in this paper (Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2009; Alfaro et al., 2011; Alfaro and Charlton, 2009 However, since our purpose is to track the whole network of …rms developed by each Business Group as de…ned in Section 2.1 and model it as a hierarchical graph (see Figure 1) , we have in principle to depart from the complete shareholding structure of each company, in order to identify one ultimate parent company, its set of a¢ liates and their relative distance within the hierarchy. To that extent, we slightly modify the original BvD algorithm in two ways: we reconcile con ‡icting information that can come from controlling and controlled subjects and we di¤erentiate between corporate and individual ultimate owners, recovering a total of 1,790, 062 …rms which belong to Business Groups (270,474 parents and 1,519,588 a¢ liates) according to our de…nition.
Con ‡icting information deriving from controlling and controlled subjects can arise in presence of cross-participations. In accordance with international standards we apply a threshold criterion (>50.01%) for the de…nition of control on the basis of (direct and indirect) participation. The latter is the methodology currently used across international institutions (OECD 2005; UNCTAD, 2009; Eurostat, 2007) , although it can lead to an overestimation of control in some bigger networks of a¢ liates. 39 That is, it is possible to end up with one a¢ liate controlled by more than one ultimate parent company even after adopting a majority threshold. To solve that problem we can rely on information o¢ cially provided by companies'consolidated …nancial accounts, when available. In particular, if we …nd that an a¢ liate is enlisted in more than one Business Group, we give priority to the ultimate parent company that enlists that a¢ liate in its consolidated accounts. In case no consolidated accounts are available we include the a¢ liate in the group where it is located at shorter control distance from the parent.
On the other hand, as the standard algorithm reports every property linkage between a company and each of its shareholders, it includes as members of potential business groups (as previously de…ned) also a¢ liates that are directly controlled by individual (non-corporate) shareholders, and that are not controlling subjects of any other company. While we have excluded these cases from our sample, we include in our analysis those corporate networks that involve at least one intermediate property linkage of a corporate nature. 40 More in detail, our modi…ed algorithm partitions all …rms for which information on ownership is available preliminarily in two groups: a) a set of independent companies, that have as controlling shareholder individuals or a family or no speci…c corporate entity, and that are not themselves controlling shareholders of any other company; b) all the other companies for which information on property linkages is available; these companies are either owned by a corporate controlling (immediate) shareholder or are themselves independent, but act as controlling shareholders of other companies.
We exclude the set a) of independent …rms from our sample, and use it as a control group for further empirical analysis (see below Table A .2 for a description of this latter sample).
The algorithm then screens every …rm belonging to group b) for the highest total (direct and indirect) participation in the equity of each company, as provided by the Ownership Database. Once it …nds a corporate controlling entity A that sums up to more than 50.01% of control in a given company B, company B is classi…ed as an a¢ liate, while the same algorithm checks the shareholding structure of company A. If the latter is in turn ultimately owned by another corporate entity C, the process is repeated until a controlling company that has no corporate controlling shareholder is found.
The latter is considered as the ultimate parent company of a¢ liate companies A, B and C. In the case of quoted companies, we consider as ultimate parent the highest company in the path of proprietary linkages we can identify.
Having identi…ed the set of a¢ liates and their parent, the algorithm then assigns a hierarchical level within each Business Group, counting from the parent how many steps of intermediate property are required for ultimate control. In case the same a¢ liate is encountered more than once in the same path (due to cross-participations), we consider it as located on the closest level where we have …nally encountered it.
A limit of the Ownership Database of Bureau Van Dijk concerns the maximum number of control levels that can be obtained after considering cross-participations: the algorithm allows to reach a maximum of 10 levels for a maximum of 1,000 a¢ liates. However, in our data only 13 Business Groups (that is 0.005% of our sample) exceed such limits. For these groups we can still obtain balance sheet data for each a¢ liate and the headquarter, but we cannot retrieve the position of each a¢ liate on the control chain. Hence, these 13 groups will be excluded from the empirical analysis involving measurements of the hierarchical complexity.
As a result of our procedure to identify Business Groups, we can derive a control group that we employ for a preliminary comparison of a¢ liates to Business Groups and non-a¢ liated …rms along di¤erent dimensions. From the above preliminary division in two groups of all …rms for which we have data in the Ownership Database, the group a) consists of 6,084,115 …rms controlled by individuals or families without control shares in any other company. Among them, however, for only 3,756,003 we can retrieve at least one …nancial account that we use for the calculation of premia in Table 2 .
In Table A .2 we report some descriptive statistics of the control group collecting non-a¢ liated …rms confronted with the set of a¢ liates belonging to Business Groups. We had already argued in Section 3.2 how a simple counting of the number of a¢ liates can be a poor proxy for the complexity of the control chain developed by a Business Group, where the hierarchy design can involve di¤erent dimensions and groups with the same number of a¢ liates can eventually come to display very di¤erent proprietary structures. Hence, we borrowed from graph theory a notion of (probabilistic) entropy able to provide a synthetic measure for the similarity of hierarchical graphs once assuming that Business Groups' control chains can be conveniently represented with a vertex (here the headquarters) connected through edges (in our case control participations) to single nodes (represented by a¢ liates) for the purpose of a coordinated management of economic activities. Thereafter we argued that a change in the original node entropy was necessary to introduce an increasing marginal complexity when a¢ liates were added at a farther distance from the headquarter, in order to discount a high communication costs with the decision-making centre. Hence, we discussed how this alteration modi…ed consequently the properties of the original measure.
In this Appendix we want to show with further details how our Group Index of Complexity (GIC) relates to both the number of a¢ liates (N ) and the original node entropy (H(G)) borrowed from graph theory exploiting our sample of Business Groups.
In Table C1 we report some descriptive statistics that already show how both the node entropy in the second column and the GIC in the third column reproduce long right-tail distributions similar to the more simple number of a¢ liates but with some di¤erences. Skewness is much higher in the case of N , while H(G) and GIC start increasing rapidly only after the 83rd percentile of our sample, di¤erently from the distribution of N which already has a right tail from the 75th percentile. Since until the 57th percentile our sample is represented by Business Groups having only one a¢ liate, both the node entropy and the GIC end up with null …gures until that point of the distribution.
However, given the logarithmic weight of formulas 3 and 4, also groups that have few a¢ liates but all positioned on a same control level (N = n l ;whatever l) end up with a H(G) and a GIC that both have null …gures until the 83rd percentile.
The latter feature can be interpreted in terms of graph theory as a minimum complexity of the hierarchical graph when nodes are all adjacent on a same level. From an economic point of view it makes sense that Business Groups having a¢ liates all located at the same proprietary distance from the headquarter are more easily coordinated in the management of their activities. Moreover, if we assume that control runs univocally from the headquarter to each single a¢ liate, the cost of maintaining a control chain with only one a¢ liate and the cost of it where more a¢ liates are however located at the same level are virtually the same.
The previous is the reason why GIC (and node entropy) is not monotonic in the number of a¢ liates, since the GIC (and the node entropy) is additive in proprietary levels but not in number of a¢ liates. Groups with the same number of a¢ liates can arrange them in one or more levels and the cost of exerting control through the network is higher in the latter case.
In Table C .2 we show however how sample distributions of GIC and N are signi…cantly correlated when we report descriptive statistics of the …rst by Business Groups'size classes The average GIC and its median in the second column is indeed increasing from small groups that have until …ve a¢ liates to bigger groups that report more than 500 a¢ liates. Standard deviations by size classes are also moderately increasing revealing that within each size class there is a certain (increasing) degree of heterogeneity of hierarchical design, con…rming that the GIC is more able to catch that heterogeneity. Indeed, in the last column, where we report maximum GIC by size classes, we do observe that even groups with only ten a¢ liates can show complex control chains comparable to bigger groups because, recalling entropy properties introduced in Section 5, the GIC grows rapidly when more a¢ liates are located on farther levels 41 .
4 1 More precisely, given N number of a¢ liates and L number of levels for each Business Group, GIC reaches its maximum when m nm N = n nn N , for each m; n 2 L, nm and nn a¢ liates on mth and nth level. That is, when the group/graph is pyramidal.
One would like to graphically compare N and GIC to observe how they behave along our sample distributions. Given their extremely long right tails, we resort to mean excess plots of Figure C .1, where graphs are the results of the following so called excess mean function (see Beirlant, Vynckier and Teugels, 1996; Coles, 2001 ):
where u 2 (x l ; x r ) where x l = inf fx : F (x) > 0g and x r = sup fx : F (x) < 1g.
Shortly, the mean excess plot gives back a transformation of the distribution such that it is represented as the excess of the consecutive sample means of a random variable Y with respect to a sequence of threshold values u picked from the same domain of random variable Y such that the cumulative distribution F (x) is de…ned on the interval (0; 1). More analytically, we can describe the mean excess function as:
with distributions of random variable Y on [0; 1).
In our speci…c case, mean excess plots in Figure C .1 begin with the …rst threshold value u di¤erent from zero as present in our sample of Business Groups (1 in the case of N and :12 in the case of GIC).
The values at which the mean excess functions are maximum are 271 for random variable N and 2.89
for random variable GIC. In both cases, we observe that after the maximum of the mean excess function, the distributions are steeply decreasing almost linearly. It means that in original (non-transformed) distributions they both report a long right-tail that is very much similar from a statistical point of view. The observation 41 of a steeply decreasing right tail after a mean excess trasformation is usually considered itself as a visual test to assume that the original distribution can be proxied by a Pareto. However, on the left tail, number of a¢ liates and GIC behave somehow di¤erently since some points of discontinuity are present for the GIC excess function but not for the N 's excess function Those discontinuities reveal that at some lower measures of hierarchical complexity there is a high density of Business Groups, a sample feature that was not observed when looking at Tables C.1 and C.2.
Finally, in Figure C .2 we report the quantile-quantile plot of GIC against N , in order to observe graphically how they behave with respect to each other by percentiles. The graph shows that the GIC has a smoother distribution especially. in the last quartile of the distribution. Thus, the GIC is able to provide a continuous measure for organization of command chains that di¤erentiates more when groups have a higher number of a¢ liates. 
